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The aim of the article is to show in what way it is possible to guarantee the 
proper representation of human interests in the parliamentary form of govern-
ment. To quote ideas of Mykolas Romeris concerning relationships between 
sovereign and State powers, it is stated that a special function of safeguarding 
of constitutionality as an expression of the Sovereign’s will ought to be provided 
in the Constitution of Parliamentary Republic. In the article, it is demonstrated 
that such function is implemented in the Constitutions of France and Germany 
by granting a President to guarantee a proper work of parliamentary system (the 
function of political and legal reserve). It is also shown that in Lithuania, which 
is considered to be a Parliamentary Republic, the President does not perform a 
function of political and legal reserve and does not have appropriate authoriza-
tions. The author of the article proposes to follow the standards of Constitutions 
of France and Germany and to reconsider the competences between the institu-
tions of the Seimas and the President. 
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Introduction
In the Constitution of Lithuania it is declared: “The nation founds the State of Lithua-
nia. Sovereignty belongs to Nation”. Further, the article 4 develops these provisions: 
“The nation exercises supreme power over its democratically elected representatives”. 
Therefore, in the Constitution it is stated that the will of a nation is a source of author-
ity powers. Only the nation is provided by the right to judge who and how one can 
govern the country. 
On October 25, 1992, the people of Lithuania voted in the referendum for the en-
actment of new Constitution and believed that this organic law will safeguard proper 
work of the democratic institutions and protection of human interests. They did not 
doubt that the Seimas and the President that were elected in free and direct elections 
will well represent the will of the Sovereign – the Nation.
Although not so much time has passed, the trust of people in authorities signifi-
cantly decreased. Many people do not believe that democratically elected State pow-
ers serve to justice and care for every Lithuanian human being. The gap between 
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authorities and electors, in the opinion of Lithuanians, is constantly growing. The de-
mocracy representing institutions that are foreseen in the Constitution, let say, are op-
erating but the distrust of people in them is growing. We can hear that the Sovereign 
in Lithuania – the Nation – in reality has lost its sovereignty and political elite while 
influential structures of business became the real Sovereign. 
The President as a guarantor of constitutionality  
in the parliamentary form of government
The competencies of State powers in the written Constitution  
as an expression of the will of the Sovereign
While speaking about the increasing distrust of people in institutions of the political 
authorities it is very important to know on what legal ground the political institutions 
of authorities in the democratic State are obliged to represent the Sovereign – the 
Nation – and to protect Its interests. In this respect, it is important to clear up what is 
the relationship between the political government as a representative of the will of the 
Sovereign and of the Sovereign Itself. Namely, this question Romeris scrutinized in 
his work Sovereignty (Romeris 1995).
The aim of Romeris research is to answer the question of how political author-
ity obtains the title to represent the State. The answer to this question is important 
in several aspects. Firstly, this answer has to show whether the Sovereign by pro-
viding the authorities with the powers to govern, at the same time provides the gov-
ernment institutions with the competence to act in the name of the Sovereign Itself? 
In other words, are the State powers institutions authorized to represent the will of 
the Sovereign directly? Secondly, it is important to clarify to what extent the citizens 
(nation) are obliged to submit to imperative decisions of political power and when 
citizens have the right to resist, if they consider that political authorities exercise the 
functions, which were entrusted by the Sovereign, not correctly?
Romeris states, that the nation while implementing the privilege of the State foun-
dation power, places all its sovereignty as if in some magazine, written Constitution. 
“From the magazine – from Constitution deposited sovereign (nation‘s will) – differ-
ent constitutionally founded organs of government, taking into account the definite 
of constitutional statutes, quasi through some culverts and taps, obtain the functional 
power to that extent to what the state foundation power founds necessary to state”, – 
Romeris resumes (Romeris 1995: 179).
With these words, the author distinctly emphasizes that the Sovereign – the Nation – 
implements its Sovereign power in the Constitution. The answer to both above formu-
lated questions follows from this statement. Although the subjects of the political au-
thorities are not the Sovereigns, through the functions determined in the Constitution 
they obtain the legal power (are empowered to exercise the functions of State authori-
ties) to act in the name of the Sovereigns. At the same time, the electors being obliged 
to recognize the competence of authorities to act in the name of the Sovereign pre-
serve the right to resist, if institutions of the political authorities infringe the limits of 
competence stated in the Constitution.
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Institution of the President as direct representative of the will  
of the Sovereign to guarantee the constitutionality
Romeris notes that after the implementation of the will of the Sovereign in the 
Constitution, the problem of constitutional construction (of constitutionality) safe-
guard becomes important. According to his opinion, there may always emerge groups 
that are determined “to grab the sovereignty magazined in the Constitution” (Romeris 
1995: 196). The means for it not to happen is to compose “several tops of authorities’ 
powers” (Romeris 1995: 203). The aim of this composition is to make it the way so 
that it is not one organ or person “in whose hands all Constitutional power would be 
concentrated” (Romeris 1995: 204).
At the same time Romeris notices another very important factor that would suit 
the good government of the State. According to him, while allocating functions of 
the State powers, it is important for eventual anarchy when “several tops of authori-
ties will generate to the several governments” (Romeris 1995: 206) not to forget to 
happen. Then, the conflicts and mutual imputations between powers are inevitable. 
When there is no united government, there proper representation of electors’ interests 
is lost.
Romeris did not propose such model of the State powers functions that would guar-
antee a good State government and would suit Lithuania today. Lithuania has chosen 
the parliamentary way. So, it would be interesting to know in what ways it is possible 
in the background of the parliamentary democracy to separate the competences of 
powers that the State authorities would not confront and would properly protect elec-
tors’ interests.
By a long way it is more plausible that it is possible to use constructively the 
Presidential institution by strengthening the efficiency of the performance of the 
Parliament. Naturally, in the Parliamentary Republic the President is the first to be 
allocated with the role of moral authority of the State. In this respect he should act 
as the conciliator of different and even competing political forces, manifesting in the 
Parliament and in the society. However, when speaking about morality of the politi-
cal powers, its most important indication pertains to how well the political powers 
serve the interests of the society and the State. Thus, moral authority of the President 
directly depends not upon his or her capability to reconcile the political fractions of 
the Parliament, but on whether these fractions do not lose a touch with their electors 
and live up to their expectations. In other words, the President must still possess cer-
tain political and legal authority to influence the Parliament to act in such a way that 
would be politically workable as well as politically responsible.
On the other hand, it is worthwhile not to forget here that in the State some func-
tions exist that, under certain conditions from political and legal standpoint, can be 
consistently entrusted to the head of the State – the President. Regardless of their 
political choice, all citizens are equally interested in the public sobriety and national 
security. Despite of the variety of political interests in the society, the State must en-
sure social integrity and in particular in times when the public turmoil or external 
intervention looms. Such area of purely national objectives of the State was discerned 
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by Romeris: “However, we are aware that the area of specific social objectives of the 
state is very narrow; these are the social order and peace and external defence (police 
in a broad sense including civil and criminal court as well as armed defence of the 
territory)” (Romeris 1995: 252).
Constitutionality protecting function in presidential institution  
according to the Constitutions of France and Germany
The first paragraph of article 5 of Section II of the French Constitution states: “The 
President of the Republic shall see that the Constitution is observed. He shall ensure, 
by his arbitration, the proper functioning of the public authorities and the continuity of 
the State”. According to Philippe Ardant, these functions of the President, i.e. the right 
to dissolve the Parliament (art. 12) or the so-called right to “impose the dictatorship 
for the rescuing of society” (art. 16) is solely the prerogative of the President; however, 
they do not grant the empowerments to govern the State (Ардан 1994: 63–64).
Probably it is possible to agree with Ardant that these are not the empowerments 
to govern the State that would grant to the President the right to take over the legis-
lation and other functions of the Parliament. The President of France under the veil 
of the society saviour may not impose one-man government to unilaterally pass the 
laws as well as implement them. However, it is noteworthy that in the times of the 
Parliamentary crisis or social confusion the President is procedurally empowered to 
act as a representative of the whole society. The President, as a reserved political fig-
ure, starts acting when other authorities objectively cannot continue performing their 
functions in a regular manner.
German specialists of constitutional law profess a somewhat similar attitude to 
the competence of the Presidential authority in the parliamentary system in their 
country. Johann Schleich maintains that in the Constitution of Germany three func-
tions of the President are stipulated, such as integration, political reserve and legal 
reserve (Шлейх 1994: 231). When performing the function of integration, the Federal 
President embodies the political unity of the society, but this does not imply that the 
President creates this unity in accordance with the model planned by him. Schleich 
emphasized: “However, the integrating function of the Federal President does not 
mean that he acts from certain, especially high, spheres. The main law does not in-
corporate any express instruction, which would imply that the Federal Government 
represents the majority, and the Federal President – the entire nation” (Шлейх 1994: 
232). This is a role of a mediator but not of the arbiter. The President does not make 
any decisions but only aids when searching for a compromise (Шлейх 1994: 232). 
Schleich pays attention to the fact that in the Constitution of Germany there is no term 
denominating the head of the State. To his opinion, “The lack of the political power in 
the President’s disposition is the basis of his force which manifests in spiritual impact 
on the public policy. The Federal President impersonates things which are common 
to everybody. Simultaneously, he epitomizes the spirit of the Constitution” (Шлейх 
1994: 232). Namely, that is his integrating function. 
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The function of the political reserve, according to Schleich, is reserved for the 
President of Germany for the periods of crisis. The judge of the German constitutional 
law ascribes the following possibilities for the performance of this function: proposi-
tion of the Federal chancellor (apparently not necessarily the one that is acceptable to 
parliamentary majority – note of the author); dissolution of the Bundestag; announce-
ment of the necessity to pass the law (Шлейх 1994: 238). The same author, basing 
upon provision of the first paragraph of article 82 of the Constitution of Germany 
which commits the President to prepare the laws for promulgation, states that “upon 
emergence of the constitution the President has the possibilities to undertake meas-
ures against violations of the constitutional system. Like a reserve player, he can join 
when there are no other ways left to overcome anti-constitutional actions of other 
authorities” (Шлейх 1994: 232). The President of Germany performs the legal reserve 
function by preparing laws, appointing ministers and high officials of the State.
“Semi-Presidential” model as a nominal form of the State  
government of Lithuania
When one speaks about the form of government of the State of Lithuania and the legal 
status of the President of the Republic of Lithuania within it, initially he would like to 
quote the thoughts of one of the most outstanding Lithuanian specialists of the con-
stitutional law Egidijus Kūris: “<…> The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania 
achieved a good deal – compromise formulations, which allow attributing the form 
of the state of Lithuania neither to strictly Presidential nor purely Parliamentary type, 
have been found. Although in this case there were obvious inconsistencies with “semi-
Presidential” model of France, this particular title was accepted the best when describ-
ing the governance approach of Lithuania” (Kūris 1998: 41). Many other Lithuanian 
specialists of politics and law sciences also define the governing of Lithuania as 
“semi-Presidential”.
Lithuania as a Parliamentary Republic
How this “semi-Presidential” model of governing is operating in reality? The prob-
lem of establishing legal status of the President in practical terms became very acute 
in 1998 after routine elections of the President of the Republic of Lithuania. In its 
resolution of 10 January 1998, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania 
first of all stated that “in line with the competence of state institutions stipulated in 
the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, the governing model of Lithuania is 
attributable to Parliamentary Republic governing form” (The Official Gazette 1998). 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court added, “some of the peculiarities of the so-
called mixed (semi-Presidential) form of governing were inherent to the govern-
ing form of Lithuania”. In response to the claim submitted by the Government, the 
Constitutional Court determined that pursuant to the Constitution of the Republic of 
Lithuania the Government must “return the powers, by expressing their respect to 
the institution of the head of the state”, but such a return of powers does not imply 
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resignation. The Constitutional Court emphasized that the newly elected President 
of the Republic of Lithuania is obliged to submit the candidacy of until-then Prime 
Minister to Seimas for repeated approval for the post of Premier. This, according to 
the Constitutional Court, “is not just a manifestation of inter-institutional courtesy”. 
Thus, the President of the Republic of Lithuania can verify, “whether Seimas contin-
ues to trust the Government”. Consequently, it follows from the arguments set forth 
by the Constitutional Court that given the form of governance of Lithuania and politi-
cal powers of the President, the Government which had earned the Seimas trust before 
the elections may continue the implementation of the program approved by Seimas. 
It may proceed until the end of term stipulated by Seimas, provided that Seimas ap-
proves their trust in premier proposed by the President. Based upon explanation of the 
Constitutional Court, there are no possibilities for the President to form a Government 
of his trust and act as a head of Presidential government. Therefore, Lithuania is a 
Parliamentary Republic.
The problem of President’s powers and the definition of His or Her  
constitutional status in Lithuania
Consequently, in order to find out what is the legal status of the President of the 
Republic of Lithuania in the constitutional system of powers’ division, it is essential 
to expressly define the legal possibilities for the President to influence the activities 
of the Parliament and the Government “in the framework of parliamentary form of 
state governance in conjunction with certain peculiarities of semi-Presidential form”. 
The Constitutional Court expressed their opinion about such legal possibilities of the 
President in the above-mentioned resolution as well. The first element of the legal sta-
tus of the President, which could be listed based on the resolution of the Constitutional 
Court, pertains to the fact that the President of the Republic of Lithuania as the head 
of the State, who is elected in direct elections, has his “program objectives”. In oth-
er words, the Constitutional Court admitted that the body of electors when electing 
the President of the Republic simultaneously vote for his program objectives, which 
the President is obligated to implement later on when performing the due functions. 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court listed some of the constitutional procedural 
forms for the implementation of program objectives of the President: a) to submit ap-
propriate draft projects of laws; b) to recommit the laws passed by Seimas (right of 
veto); c) to appeal to the Constitutional Court regarding the compliance of deeds of 
the Government to the Constitution and the legislation; d) to announce notifications 
about the situation in Lithuania, internal or foreign policy.
Another element of special significance of the legal status of the President estab-
lished by the Constitutional Court should pertain to the fact that basing on the con-
stitutional model of the State powers’ division provided for in the Constitution (arti-
cle 5), the President is “a part of the executive branch”. However, the Constitutional 
Court did not equate the Presidential authorizations to the President of the Presidential 
Republic. Instead, the Constitutional Court remarked that “the President is the head 
of the state, he represents the state and fulfils all that is committed to him by the 
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Constitution and the legislation, and the Government is the executive managing insti-
tution of the State”.
After an in-depth analysis of the discussed legal means for the President of the 
Republic of Lithuania to make political impact on operations of the Government and 
the Parliament, it can be noted that a possibility for a conflict of state powers exists 
in the form of governing of the State of Lithuania which is defined as “Parliamentary 
form with some peculiarities of semi-Presidential form”. Indeed, during the direct 
elections to Seimas the electorate grants to the Parliamentary majority the right to 
form the Government and to implement the Government program, supported by the 
majority of Parliament. The directly elected President of the Republic of Lithuania is, 
in turn, granted by the electorate the authority to pursue his “program objectives”. 
He can realize those through the above-mentioned procedures, which are stipulated 
in the Constitution. However, the Constitution does not state which program, that of 
the President or the parliamentary majority, has a superior legal status. Therefore, ini-
tially formally, de jure, it is likely that a situation will occur where individual pro-
visions of the Government program of the parliamentary majority and those of the 
program of the President (direct obligations to the electors) may differ or even con-
flict. Consequently, this implies that there is a possibility for a conflict of the State 
powers between the President and the majority of Parliament in conjunction with the 
Government supported by them, programmed in the Constitution of the Republic of 
Lithuania, when these two powers interpret their obligations to the electors differently. 
Of course, such conflict would be hardly plausible if the Presidential elections would 
have been won by the candidate who was supported by the ruling political majority 
and who, inter alia, would be declaring in his electoral program objectives the same 
or similar ideas to those of the ruling majority of the Parliament. In contrary, it may 
happen that the Presidential elections will be won by the candidate who is supported 
by the party, opposing to the ruling majority of the Parliament or even by a non-party 
candidate. Particularly in that case the possibility of disagreement or conflict of the 
State powers becomes likely indeed.
“The divided power” of the State’s authorities and the subjective nature  
of assurance of solidarity of the State’s authorities in Lithuania
When speaking about the possibility for a conflict of the State powers programmed in 
a constitutional level, one can appeal to the insights and conclusions of the judges of 
constitutional law. Giovanni Sartori, a famous Italian political scientist, renowned in 
the world for his election systems and theories of democracy, when assessing the op-
eration of interaction of the American constitutional powers, in his book Comparative 
Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes sin-
gled out the following two concepts: the first: “division and separation of powers”; 
and the second: “the divided power” (Sartory 2001: 96–98). The first notion conveys 
such interaction of the American powers where the Congress and the President while 
representing two different powers, do not conflict among themselves and pursue “the 
united policy”. According to Sartori, such situation usually occurs in cases when “the 
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same majority controls the executive branch as well as the Congress” in the American 
constitutional practice”. “Such were the theory as well as practice of the governing of 
America for a century and a half” (Sartory 2001: 97). Simultaneously Sartori notes 
that there are periods in the American practice, when the conflicting “model of the 
divided power” prevails. In 1954 as well as in 1957 Dwight D. Eisenhower was the 
first President over the period of seventy two years who had to deal with the Congress 
controlled by the opposition party”. Later on “from 1955 to 1992 the governing has 
been divided for twenty six years out of thirty eight” and “over the period from 1969 
to 1992 the governing was divided for twenty years out of twenty four” (Sartory 2001: 
97). Such structure of the “divided power” in particular, as Sartori noted, is iniquitous 
due to the reason that “it reveals in front of our eyes the broken-up and contrasting 
political community, where every of the two most important components interpret 
their own electoral interest in general as a failure of the other institution. To support 
a Republican President for the Congress controlled by the democrats equals to cry for 
another cadence of the Republican. And vice-versa, the president who has the minor-
ity (in Congress) and is seeking to re-enact the undivided governing, cannot do with-
out throwing accusations at the Congress” (Sartory 2001: 98).
To go back to the assessment of the relationships between Lithuanian powers, it 
can be stated that the conflicting relationships between the President and the parlia-
mentary majority could be characterized precisely as the situation of “divided pow-
ers”. The possibility for such an assessment is confirmed by actual examples, when 
the president and parliamentary majority represent different political forces. For in-
stance, Valdas Adamkus, who won the presidential elections in 1997 has large ambi-
tions to pursue his electoral promises. Being unable to constitute his government (as 
mentioned, such a possibility was eliminated by the resolution of the Constitutional 
Court which stated that Lithuania was a Parliamentary Republic with features charac-
teristic to the semi-Presidential Republic), the President Adamkus recounted his elec-
toral program in the beginning of 1999, when making an annual report in Seimas on 
the situation in Lithuania, internal and foreign policy of the Republic of Lithuania, 
as stipulated in Section 18 of article 84 of the Constitution. In His annual report, the 
President declared that “He will be representing the interests of all citizens and not 
those of separate political parties or economic groups”. Furthermore, He admitted 
that despite His “extremely high moral and political responsibility, laid upon by the 
Constitution, the President as the head of the state has “only limited authority to live 
up to this responsibility”. By reference to His limited political possibilities, in particu-
lar the President Adamkus in delicate form invited the members of Seimas “to openly 
exchange different opinions, discuss” and “after finding the solutions, to implement 
them fairly for the welfare of people and for the good of the State”. Further events 
demonstrated that electoral objectives of the President, set forth in the annual report, 
have not become an integral part of the Government program. Confrontation, but 
not a dialogue, took place between the Government supported by the majority of the 
Seimas and the President Adamkus, which ended in the President Adamkus’ public 
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motion of non-confidence in spring of 2000 against the head of the Government 
Gediminas Vagnorius, who resigned following this motion of the President.
The situation of the “divided power” arose in Lithuania after the next presiden-
tial elections as well. Rolandas Paksas, who became the President of the Republic of 
Lithuania at the end of 2002, also had an ambitious political program and the resolu-
tion to pursue it. Under the headship of the President Paksas regular meetings of the 
President and the members of the Government, where the President used to express 
his attitude to the operations of the Ministries and the requests became a norm. The 
legal basis for such meetings was the second part of article 96 of the Constitution, 
which stipulates that “while presiding over the assigned areas of governing, the minis-
ters are accountable to Seimas, the President of the Republic of Lithuania and directly 
under the control of the Prime Minister”. Not long afterwards, in autumn 2003, an 
impeachment process was initiated against the President Paksas, which ended with 
Paksas’ removal from the office.
As it can be seen, Constitutions of France and Germany provide for the President’s 
integrating function as well as the political reserve function. When having the possi-
bility to join the political process only as a reserve figure, the President cannot hinder 
the work of the parliamentary government. Thus, the “divided power” situation is pre-
vented and the unity of the policy pursued by the authorities is ensured. The possibility 
for the President of France to regularly supervise the Parliament and the Government 
of the parliamentary majority is worth of a separate notice. It is the right to dissolve 
the Parliament, when the President deems advisable. It could be considered as a politi-
cal measure unrepresentative of parliamentary form. However, when anticipating or 
taking into account the condition that having dissolved the Lower House the President 
does not obtain the right to constitute His own government but must commence pre-
mature elections and entrust the executive branch to the newly elected majority of the 
Parliament, it can be stated that the President’s right to dissolve the Parliament is a 
constitutional means, available to Him to ensure politically responsible to the electors 
activities of the entire Parliament and the government of parliamentary majority. In 
this respect, the idea of the famous French specialist of last century of constitutional 
law Adhémar Esmein looks easily understandable: “the Parliament dissolution right is 
the key and almost core feature of parliamentary governance” (Esmein 1932: 263).
Constitutional possibilities to improve the parliamentary  
efficiency system in Lithuania
When speaking about the possibilities for the President of the Republic of Lithuania 
to perform the functions of protecting constitutionality and the political and legal 
reserve, it can be stated that these possibilities are very limited and barely nominal. 
The President may not dissolve the Seimas not only when He or She is confident that 
Seimas has lost the trust of electorate (e.g. as in France) but even in cases when there 
are difficulties in the constitution of the political majority which forms the Government 
and when this majority does not form altogether for an indefinite period of time. In 
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such case the President would be forced to live with formation of the Government of 
Seimas’ minority. Furthermore, the President of the Republic of Lithuania is not enti-
tled to appeal to the Constitutional Court regarding verification of constitutionality of 
individual acts passed by Seimas. Apparently, without authorizations to perform the 
functions of the political and legal reserve (e.g., the right to dissolve Seimas in cases 
where the latter due to its imprudence loses the trust of electors), the President can 
perform His integrating function also in a limited way. Every member of the Seimas 
is aware that his cadence lasts for four years regardless of his performance. This cir-
cumstance inevitably conditions the fact that every member of the Seimas tends to 
demonstrate his oneness or, conversely, passiveness. It becomes more complicated for 
the members of the Seimas to search for compromises and to make collegial decisions 
in general. 
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TAUTOS SUVERENITETAS PARLAMENTINĖJE 
LIETUVOS SISTEMOJE: PROBLEMOS IR PASIŪLYMAI
Saulius Arlauskas
Santrauka
Straipsnyje siekiama parodyti, kaip parlamentinė valdymo forma gali užti-
krinti deramą žmonių interesų atstovavimą. Remiantis Mykolo Romerio idė-
jomis apie suvereno ir valdžios santykį teigiama, kad parlamentinės valsty-
bės Konstitucijoje privalo būti numatyta speciali konstitucingumo apsaugos 
funkcija kaip suvereno valios išraiška. Parodoma, kad tokia funkcija numatyta 
Prancūzijos ir Vokietijos Konstitucijose, suteikiant Prezidentui funkciją užti-
krinti deramą parlamentinės sistemos veikimą (politinio ir teisinio rezervo 
funkcija). Atskleidžiama, kad Lietuvoje, kuri taip pat yra laikoma parlamentine 
respublika, Prezidentas politinio ir teisinio rezervo funkcijos neatlieka ir atitin-
kamų įgaliojimų neturi. Straipsnyje siūloma pasekti Prancūzijos ar Vokietijos 
Konstitucijų pavyzdžiu ir peržiūrėti Seimo bei Prezidento kompetencijas.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: Konstitucija, Lietuva, suverenitetas, valstybės valdžios 
padalijimas. 
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